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35 
UNDER ATTACK: THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO 
KNOW AND THE WAR ON TERROR 
Mary-Rose Papandrea* 
Abstract: Since the September 11 attacks, courts have been reluctant 
to uphold the public’s right to obtain government information through the 
Freedom of Information Act and the First Amendment right of access. 
Given the doctrinal and statutory confusion plaguing both FOIA and the 
First Amendment right of access since their inception, and the judiciary’s 
historic tendency to defer to the Executive in matters implicating national 
security, recent appellate decisions rejecting right to know claims may 
seem unsurprising. But a closer reading of these cases reveals that the 
judiciary’s failure to uphold the public’s right to government transparency 
has been based on a fundamental lack of appreciation for and hostility to 
the right’s very existence. These cases suggest that an enforceable right 
to know is unnecessary because the political process is adequate to 
force government disclosure. History amply demonstrates, however, the 
political process’s incapacity to compel government disclosure, 
particularly when the nation is in a time of crisis and the government 
activities at issue concern noncitizens. 
Introduction 
 Since the September 11 attacks, the government has used non-
traditional methods to detain, process, and prosecute individuals al-
legedly engaged in terrorist activities. One clear benefit of these non-
traditional procedures has been that the government has been able to 
control the flow of information concerning its counterterrorism efforts 
by relying on the processes to which the public’s constitutional and 
statutory “right to know” is at least arguably inapplicable. In addition, 
the government has capitalized on the judiciary’s hesitation to force 
the disclosure of any information that will allegedly harm national se-
curity. 
 The judiciary’s general unwillingness to enforce the “right to 
know” in a time of crisis is not surprising given the relatively short and 
tortured history of this right under the Freedom of Information Act 
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(FOIA) and the First Amendment. In addition to this long-standing doc-
trinal confusion, the courts’ historic deference to the Executive’s 
analysis of national security risks made the decisions even less sur-
prising. But what was surprising was that, by rejecting the right of ac-
cess claims, courts revealed a singular lack of appreciation of and al-
most hostility to the right of access, particularly when the subjects of 
the desired information and proceedings were noncitizens. Not only 
did the courts defer to the Executive’s national security claims, but 
they also deferred to the assumption about noncitizens that biased 
these claims: namely, that noncitizens are more likely than not to be 
involved in terrorist activities. Moreover, the courts exhibited a naive 
reliance upon the capacity of the political process to force government 
disclosure. History has demonstrated that without an enforceable right 
to know about government activities, the executive branch is likely to 
reveal only the information that serves its purposes, whatever they 
may be. 
 This Article suggests that the courts must keep in mind the in-
terest in effective self-government that drove FOIA’s passage in 1966 
and the recognition of the First Amendment right of access in 1980. 
The right to know is more, not less, important in a time of crisis, and 
it is no less important when the rights of noncitizens are at issue. In-
deed, history amply demonstrates that it is during times of crisis that 
the government is more likely to engage in questionable behavior 
and employ secrecy to conceal its failures. 
 Part I discusses the history and development of the public’s con-
stitutional and statutory rights of access to government information 
and proceedings. Although the right to know has been firmly estab-
lished for over thirty years, even prior to September 11, courts hesi-
tated to compel the government to disclose any information that al-
legedly involved national security. In addition, courts had already 
been struggling with some doctrinal difficulties encountered in defin-
ing and applying the First Amendment right of access. 
 Part II discusses the government’s efforts to circumvent this “right 
to know” by detaining noncitizens incommunicado in Guantanamo 
Bay, labeling some U.S. citizens “enemy combatants,” and gagging 
others tried in the criminal justice system. Although the government 
purports to be more forthcoming with information about U.S. citizens 
who are suspected of engaging in terrorist activities, the public’s 
knowledge of these individuals in reality is one-sided and woefully in-
adequate to scrutinize government actions. Part II summarizes the two 
appellate court decisions reviewing the closure of immigration hear-
ings for the hundreds of aliens rounded up after September 11, and a 
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third appellate court decision rejecting a FOIA request for basic infor-
mation about these detainees. 
 Part III argues that these decisions were in some ways not sur-
prising given the doctrinal confusion that has plagued the right of ac-
cess since its beginnings. But what was disturbing about these deci-
sions is that they represent a return to the days prior to 1970, when 
the judiciary regarded the right of access as unnecessary for a func-
tional democracy; instead, courts said the political process alone suffi-
ciently checked government power. Historically, however, the political 
process has proven impotent and incapable of forcing disclosures of 
information the government prefers to keep secret, especially when 
the rights of noncitizens are at issue. 
I. The History of the Right to Know 
 The “right to know” has no single definition. When scholars and 
courts cite to the “right to know,” they may be referring to a number 
of different things, including “the rights to receive information from 
willing sources, to gather information from willing or neutral sources, 
and to acquire information from a perhaps unwilling governmental 
source.”1 The first two require the government to refrain from ac-
tion—namely, to refrain from interfering with information dissemina-
tion or consumption. The last, however, requires the government to 
provide information for public debate.2 It is this “affirmative” right to 
know, also known as the right of access, on which this Article fo-
cuses. 
 The public’s statutory and constitutional rights to access federal 
government information and proceedings are relatively new. Before 
the FOIA was passed in 1966, the executive branch agencies could, 
in essence, deny access to information at will. As Harold Cross re-
ported in his seminal 1954 work on the right of access, “[t]he dismay-
ing, bewildering fact is that in the absence of a general or specific act 
of Congress creating a clear right to inspect—and such acts are not 
numerous—there is no enforceable legal right in public or press to 
                                                                                                               
1 David Mitchell Ivester, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 Hastings Const. L.Q. 
109, 109 (1977). 
2 See Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering 
the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 95, 102–03 
(2004) (drawing a distinction between “negative structuralism,” which prevents the gov-
ernment from interfering with the dissemination and consumption of speech, with “af-
firmative structuralism,” which requires the government to provide access to its proceed-
ings or information in its possession). 
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inspect any federal non-judicial record.”3 Although the common law 
provided a limited right of access to judicial documents, it was only in 
1980 that the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment guaran-
teed the public a right of access to criminal trials.4 
 FOIA and the First Amendment right of access are powerful 
mechanisms by which the press and public alike can force the dis-
closure of and obtain access to government documents and pro-
ceedings. Even before September 11, 2001, however, the judiciary 
struggled to apply these rights. Courts reviewing FOIA claims have 
always been extremely reluctant to question the government’s asser-
tion that releasing the requested information would threaten national 
security. Likewise, courts have struggled to make sense of how to 
apply the constitutional right of access outside the context of criminal 
trials. In light of all of the difficulties existing before the terrorist at-
tacks on U.S. soil, it is perhaps not surprising that the courts stum-
bled after September 11 when asked to force information disclosures 
that, the government claimed, would threaten national security. 
A. First Amendment Right of Access 
 The United States Supreme Court did not recognize the existence 
of a First Amendment right of access until it decided Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia in 1980.5 Prior to that decision, the Court had 
never acknowledged such a right, and in fact its decisions suggested 
that it never would. After its Richmond Newspapers decision, the Court 
decided three more First Amendment right of access cases in quick 
succession, extending the right of access to pretrial hearings and voir 
dire proceedings. Since the mid-1980s, however, the Court has left the 
development of the doctrine to the lower courts.6 The appellate courts 
appear to have reached a consensus that the right of access extends 
to civil trials, but even before September 11, they have deeply dis-
agreed about whether and how to apply the Richmond Newspapers 
history-and-logic test outside of traditional judicial proceedings. For this 
                                                                                                               
3 Harold L. Cross, The People’s Right to Know 197 (1954). 
4 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). 
5 See id. (holding that the First Amendment guarantees the public’s right to attend 
criminal trials). 
6 See Eugene Cerruti, “Dancing in the Courthouse”: The First Amendment Right of 
Access Opens a New Round, 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 237, 263–69 (1995) (discussing the 
holdings of Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), Press-Enter. 
Co. v. Superior Court I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), and Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court II, 
478 U.S. 1 (1986), as well as lower court right of access cases). 
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reason, the courts’ struggle to apply the right of access after Septem-
ber 11 can be seen as simply a continuation of the doctrinal difficulties 
that have plagued the right since its inception. More disturbingly, how-
ever, these recent cases contain echoes of the Court’s decisions to 
prior Richmond Newspapers, where the Court questioned the very de-
sirability of any such right. 
1. Prior to Richmond Newspapers 
 In his concurring opinion in the Richmond Newspapers, Justice 
Stevens noted the monumental nature of the decision: “This is a wa-
tershed case. Until today the Court has accorded virtually absolute 
protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but never be-
fore has it squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is 
entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever.”7 
 In decisions preceding Richmond Newspapers, the Court 
seemed to reject a First Amendment right of access. As one scholar 
noted, the right “had been so consistently and emphatically rejected 
by the Supreme Court that by the late 1970s, it was considered an 
all but dead letter.”8 
 Early First Amendment cases recognized the right of private enti-
ties to impart—and of the public to receive—information. For example, 
in Grosjean v. American Press Co., the Court declared unconstitu-
tional a state tax on the advertising revenues of newspapers.9 In 
reaching its holding, the Court explained that “informed public opinion 
is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment,” and that the 
tax, designed “to limit the circulation of information” to the public, went 
“to the heart of the natural right of the members of an organized soci-
ety, united for their common good, to impart and acquire information 
about their common interests.”10 In other cases, the Court rejected a 
prohibition on door-to-door distribution of literature11 and the Post-
master’s detention of Communist propaganda.12 These decisions rec-
                                                                                                               
7 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
8 Cerruti, supra note 6, at 238.  
9 297 U.S. 233, 240, 251 (1936). 
10 Id. at 243, 250. 
11 See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142, 149 (1943). 
12 See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 302, 307 (1965). In Zemel v. 
Rusk, decided the same Term, the Court rejected the argument that the government’s 
refusal to permit travel to Cuba unconstitutionally interfered with the right to obtain infor-
mation. See 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). The Court characterized the travel restriction as “an 
inhibition of action,” not speech, and that in any event, “[t]he right to speak and publish 
does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.” Id. at 16–17. 
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ognized that the government cannot interfere with an individual’s con-
stitutional right to receive information from a willing speaker. Although 
these cases emphasized the importance of an informed public in a 
democracy, none addressed whether the First Amendment gave the 
public the right to force the government to disclose information. 
 In the 1970s, the Court decided a trio of prison access cases that 
seemed to sound the death knell for any First Amendment right of ac-
cess to government information: Pell v. Procunier,13 Saxbe v. Wash-
ington Post Co.,14 and Houchins v. KQED, Inc.15 Pell and Saxbe 
concerned substantially similar state and federal prison regulations 
that prohibited journalists from interviewing willing inmates the re-
ported had selected.16 In both cases, the journalists argued that the 
regulations violated their First Amendment right to collect and publish 
information of great public concern.17 Rather than directly confronting 
the alleged First Amendment right of access to information, the Court 
construed the issue as one of comparative access given to the press 
and the public. Deeming the disputed regulations in Pell and Saxbe 
indistinguishable, the Court held that the government had no duty to 
provide the press with information that was not generally available to 
the public; because both the federal and state regulations granted the 
press access equal to that given to the public, the reporters’ First 
Amendment claims failed.18 In both cases, although the public was 
given some access to the prisons, the general tone of the two opinions 
suggested that a majority of the justices believed that the First Amend-
ment provided no affirmative right of access to government informa-
tion at all. Indeed, Justices Powell, Brennan, and Marshall noted as 
                                                                                                               
13 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
14 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
15 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“Neither the First Amendment nor the 
Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources 
of information within the government’s control.”). 
16 See Pell, 417 U.S. at 819; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844. Pell concerned a regulation of 
the California Department of Corrections, which provided that “[p]ress and other media 
interviews with specific individual inmates will not be permitted.” 417 U.S. at 819. At issue 
in Saxbe was a federal regulation that provided that: 
[p]ress representatives will not be permitted to interview individual inmates. 
This rule shall apply even where the inmate requests or seeks an interview. 
However, conversation may be permitted with inmates whose identity is not 
to be made public, if it is limited to the discussion of institutional facilities, 
programs and activities. 
417 U.S. at 844 n.1. 
17 See Pell, 417 U.S. at 829–30; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 845. 
18 See Pell, 417 U.S. at 834–35; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850. 
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much in their Pell and Saxbe dissents, arguing that “[f]rom all that ap-
pears in the Court’s opinion, one would think that any governmental 
restriction on access to information, no matter how severe, would be 
constitutionally acceptable to the majority so long as it does not single 
out the media for special disabilities not applicable to the public at 
large.”19 
 Houchins, decided only a few years after Pell and Saxbe, in-
volved an even more restrictive prison access regulation, but the plu-
rality’s hostility to an affirmative right of access was more vehement 
and direct.20 Only seven justices took part in the decision.21 Al-
though the question presented in the case was whether the press 
had a greater right of access to government-controlled information 
than the public, Chief Justice Burger, writing the plurality opinion 
joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, held that there was no such 
right of access at all.22 Burger drew a distinction between the First 
Amendment right to communicate acquired information and the as-
serted right to compel the government to produce information, noting 
that while the Court’s opinions had repeatedly recognized the former, 
it had never endorsed the latter.23 
 In rejecting an affirmative right of access, Burger expressed con-
cern that such recognition would “invite[] the Court to involve itself in 
what is clearly a legislative task which the Constitution has left to the 
political processes.”24 He explained that “[p]ublic bodies and public 
officers . . . may be coerced by public opinion to disclose what they 
might prefer to conceal.”25 According to Burger, the Constitution does 
not require the government to disclose information; instead, “we must 
rely, as so often in our system we must, on the tug and pull of the po-
                                                                                                               
19 Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 857 (Powell, J., dissenting); see Pell, 417 U.S. at 835 (Powell, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 836 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
20 See 438 U.S. at 3, 9, 15. 
21 Id. at 16. The two absent justices were Justices Blackmun and Marshall. Id. 
22 See id. at 3, 9. “The question presented is whether the news media have a consti-
tutional right of access to a county jail, over and above that of other persons, to interview 
inmates and make sound recordings, films, and photographs for publication and broad-
casting by newspapers, radio, and television.” Id. at 3. 
23 See id. at 9 (noting that, “[t]his Court has never intimated a First Amendment 
guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information within government control. Nor 
does the rationale of the decisions upon which respondents rely lead to the implication of 
such a right.”). 
24 Id. at 12. 
25 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 14. 
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litical forces in American society.”26 Burger pointed out that broad-
casters remained free to receive (and publish) information about the 
prison from inmates, visitors to the prison, public officials, and institu-
tional personnel.27 He also expressed concern about the lack of exist-
ing standards governing a First Amendment right of access: “Because 
the Constitution affords no guidelines, absent statutory standards, 
hundreds of judges would . . . be at large to fashion [ad hoc] stan-
dards, in individual cases, according to their own ideas of what seems 
‘desirable’ or ‘expedient.’”28 In a separate concurring opinion, Justice 
Stewart agreed that the Constitution does not give the public a right of 
access to information and instead “does no more than assure the pub-
lic and the press equal access once government has opened its 
doors.”29 
 Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Powell, disagreed with the plurality’s conclusion that the 
First Amendment does not guarantee the public a right of access to 
government information.30 Drawing upon the political theory argu-
ments that would later become the foundation for Richmond News-
papers, Stevens argued that “[t]he preservation of a full and free flow 
of information to the general public has long been recognized as a 
core objective of the First Amendment to the Constitution.”31 As Jus-
tice Powell had done in his Saxbe dissent, Stevens observed that the 
Court had long interpreted the First Amendment as embracing not 
only the right to communicate information in one’s possession, but 
also the right to receive information and ideas.32 Citing Alexander 
Meiklejohn and James Madison, he explained that the right to re-
                                                                                                               
26 Id. at 14, 15 (quoting Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 Hastings L.J. 631, 636 
(1975)). 
27 Id. at 15. 
28 Id. at 14. 
29 Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion was no 
surprise. In 1975, Justice Stewart wrote a law review article famously declaring that: 
[t]here is no constitutional right to have access to particular government in-
formation, or to require openness from the bureaucracy. The public’s interest 
in knowing about its government is protected by the guarantee of a Free 
Press, but the protection is indirect. The Constitution is neither a Freedom of 
Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act. 
Stewart, supra note 26, at 636. 
30 See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
31 See id. at 30. 
32 See id.; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 862–63. 
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ceive information is based on the need for an informed citizenry, 
which is essential for self-government.33 
 One final pre-Richmond Newspapers case bears mentioning. In 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, the Court held in a split decision that the 
press had no right of access to pretrial criminal proceedings.34 Al-
though the petitioner’s challenge implicated both the First and Sixth 
Amendments, the majority’s opinion chiefly addressed only the Sixth 
Amendment claim.35 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, de-
clared that the Sixth Amendment “right to a speedy and public trial” 
was a right that was “personal to the accused.”36 He conceded that 
the public had a strong interest in open trials, and that “[o]penness in 
court proceedings may improve the quality of testimony, induce un-
known witnesses to come forward with relevant testimony, cause all 
trial participants to perform their duties more conscientiously, and 
generally give the public an opportunity to observe the judicial sys-
tem.”37 Despite this, however, Stewart maintained that the public 
had no right independent of the accused to assert a Sixth Amend-
ment right to an open trial.38 After all, he declared, “our adversary 
system of criminal justice is premised upon the proposition that the 
public interest is fully protected by the participants in the litigation.”39 
 In Gannett, the Court specifically rejected the petitioner’s invita-
tion “to narrow [its] rulings in Pell, Saxbe, and Houchins at least to 
the extent of recognizing a First and Fourteenth Amendment right to 
attend criminal trials.”40 The majority explained that “[w]e need not 
decide in the abstract . . . whether there is any such constitutional 
right” because “even assuming, arguendo, that the First and Four-
teenth Amendments may guarantee such access in some situations, 
a question we do not decide,” the trial court properly rejected this 
alleged right of access, because, among other things, the petitioner 
failed to object in a timely manner to the closure orders.41 Although 
                                                                                                               
33 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 31–32. 
34 443 U.S. 368, 370, 394 (1979) (5–4 decision). 
35 See Cerruti, supra note 6, at 257 (noting that “[a]lthough the petitioners had relied 
principally upon the First Amendment to challenge the closure order, this issue all but 
disappeared from the five separate opinions in the case. The matter was treated by the 
Justices on both sides almost exclusively as a Sixth Amendment issue.”). 
36 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 379–80. 
37 Id. at 383. 
38 See id. at 384. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 392. 
41 See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 392. 
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Justice Rehnquist wrote separately to argue that the petitioner had 
no First Amendment right of access, and Justice Powell wrote sepa-
rately to assert the right’s existence, but that the interest in a fair trial 
carried more weight, the dissenters acknowledged the petitioner’s 
First Amendment claim by stating only that “this Court heretofore has 
not found, and does not today find, any First Amendment right of ac-
cess to judicial or other governmental proceedings,” and that accord-
ingly the dissent would focus on the Sixth Amendment claim.42 
 Although none of the Court’s pre-1980 decisions ever squarely 
determined whether the public enjoyed a First Amendment right of 
access or right to information, the dicta of the majority and plurality 
opinions in these cases certainly made the Court’s eventual recogni-
tion of such a right appear implausible at best. 
2. The Revolutionary Richmond Newspapers Decision 
 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia marked a seismic shift in 
the Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment. In this case the 
Court recognized, for the first time, that the First Amendment played a 
structural role in requiring an open government.43 After several years 
of opinions wherein the Court seemingly rejected the notion of a First 
Amendment right of access, seven of the eight justices deciding Rich-
mond Newspapers declared that the First Amendment did in fact 
guarantee the press and public a right of access to the government.44 
Although the case directly concerned the public’s right to attend a 
criminal trial, the opinion’s theoretical implications were much broader. 
 Neither Chief Justice Burger, writing a plurality opinion joined by 
Justices White and Stevens, nor Justice Brennan, writing a concur-
ring opinion joined by Justice Marshall, found the lack of an explicit 
constitutional provision guaranteeing the right of access to be a bar-
rier.45 Instead, Burger explained, like the rights of association and of 
privacy, the right of access is “implicit” in the enumerated rights.46 
Underlying this implicit right, Burger elaborated, is the long history of 
                                                                                                               
42 See id. at 398–99, 402 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 403–04 (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring); id. at 411 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
43 See 448 U.S. at 580 (holding that the First Amendment guarantees the public’s 
right to attend criminal trials) (Burger, J., plurality op.). 
44 See id. Justice Powell did not take part in the decision. Id. at 581. Justice 
Rehnquist was the lone dissenter. See id. at 604. 
45 See id. at 579–80. 
46 Id. 
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open criminal trials in both England and colonial America.47 Citing 
scholars such as Jeremy Bentham and William Blackstone, who had 
argued that public scrutiny is the best “check” on perjury, bias, and 
other misconduct by trial participants,48 Burger noted the “significant 
community therapeutic value” of public trials by “providing an outlet 
for community concern, hostility, and emotion.”49 Open trials can 
thus function to restrain “self-help” measures and vigilantism, Burger 
explained, because regardless of the result, public trials “operat[e] to 
restore the imbalance which was created by the offense or public 
charge, to reaffirm the temporarily lost feeling of security and, per-
haps, to satisfy that latent ‘urge to punish.’”50 If the public is ex-
cluded from the process, it cannot be sure that “justice” is being 
done, and “an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the 
system at best has failed and at worst has been corrupted.”51 
 Finally, the Burger plurality stated that openness is essential for 
the proper functioning of government itself, as it increases “respect 
for the law” and knowledge of “the methods of government,” while 
also securing strong confidence in judicial remedies that “could 
never be inspired by a system of secrecy.”52 Public attendance at 
trials enables citizens to understand the judicial process both gener-
ally and in a particular case. Burger remarked that “[p]eople in an 
open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is 
difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observ-
ing.”53 Because the trial court failed to consider a First Amendment 
right of access and alternatives short of total closure, Burger re-
versed the trial court‘s judgment.54 
                                                                                                               
47 See id. at 564–69, 573. 
48 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569. Bentham stated: 
Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, 
all other checks are of small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other 
institutions might present themselves in the character of checks, would be 
found to operate rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks 
only in appearance. 
Id. (quoting 1 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524 (1827)). 
49 Id. at 570–71. 
50 See id. at 571 (quoting Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to 
Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1961)). 
51 See id. 
52 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572 (quoting Bentham, supra note 48, at 
525). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 580–81. 
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 In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Bren-
nan explicitly emphasized that the right of access plays a structural 
role “in securing and fostering our republican system of self-
government.”55 For Brennan, it is insufficient to protect only the rights 
of a speaker and a listener.56 He explained that the First Amendment 
protects not only “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” public debate, 
“but also the antecedent assumption that valuable public debate . . . 
must be informed.”57 At the same time, Brennan recognized that the 
right of access could be “theoretically endless,” and proposed two 
“helpful principles” to determine whether the right of access attached 
in a particular case: the history of openness of a proceeding, and the 
value of openness to the proceeding itself.58 Applying both principles 
to criminal trials, Brennan concluded that they indicated that trials 
should be presumptively open to the public.59 
 In the six years following Richmond Newspapers, the Court’s de-
cisions in three additional First Amendment right of access cases de-
clared that the presumptive right of access applied to voir dire pro-
ceedings, sexual assault trials, and preliminary hearings.60 Although 
the four separate opinions in Richmond Newspapers left unclear what 
standard the lower courts should apply to determine whether a pre-
sumptive First Amendment right of access attaches, in these subse-
quent cases the Court adopted a two-prong history-and-logic test de-
rived from Justice Brennan’s Richmond Newspapers concurrence.61 
This inquiry requires the consideration of two factors: (1) whether the 
proceeding has traditionally been open to the public, and (2) whether 
public access to the proceeding at issue would play a positive role.62 
If the right of access attaches, the proceeding can only be closed only 
                                                                                                               
55 See id. at 587, 589–95 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
56 See id. at 586–87. 
57 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (quoting, in part, N.Y. Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
58 See id. at 588–89 (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., Address, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 
173, 177 (1979)). 
59 See id. at 598. 
60 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13 (preliminary hearings); Press-Enterprise I, 
464 U.S. at 510, 513 (voir dire proceedings); Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 610–11 
(sexual assault trials). 
61 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8–9 (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 
605–06); Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605–06 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 
U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring)); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580–81 (Bur-
ger, J., plurality op.); id. at 598 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 600–01 (Stewart, J., con-
curring). Some dissenting justices disagreed with this notion.  
62 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. 
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if the court makes specific findings that a “compelling governmental 
interest” necessitates closure, and that the closure is “narrowly tai-
lored” to serve that interest.63 By applying a strict scrutiny standard, 
the Court made clear that the public’s First Amendment right of access 
rises to the same level as the right to communicate.64 
 Commentators have attacked Richmond Newspapers and its 
progeny on a number of levels, most vigorously for the Court’s failure 
to reconcile its recognition of a First Amendment right of access with 
its prior decisions in Pell, Saxbe, Houchins, and Gannett,65 as well as 
the practical and theoretical difficulties of applying the history and logic 
tests.66 Rather than confront these criticisms, the Supreme Court has 
instead declined to decide a First Amendment right of access case 
                                                                                                               
63 See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510; Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07. 
64 See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510; Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07. 
In his dissent in Globe Newspaper, Chief Justice Burger, however, argued that the right 
of access should not be treated the same as the right to disseminate information or to 
discuss ideas publicly, and that instead the court should merely ask whether the restric-
tion is “reasonable” and then balance the competing interests of access and closure. 
Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 615–16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued 
that “the right of access is plainly not coextensive with the right of expression” because 
closure laws “do not deter protected activity in the way that other laws sometimes inter-
fere with the right of expression.” Id. at 621. Justice Stevens also dissented in Press-
Enterprise II, noting that the right of access is protected by the First Amendment but does 
not rise to the same level as “a right to publish or otherwise communicate information 
lawfully or unlawfully acquired.” See 478 U.S. at 17–18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
65 See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 213 (3d Cir. 
2002) (highlighting that the problem with the “history” prong is a lack of guidelines as to 
how much time need elapse before something meets the test; a string of cases show that 
a “1000-year history is unnecessary,” but a 38-year-old presumption of openness created 
by a Department of Justice regulation is too recent). 
66 Justice Burger’s plurality in Richmond Newspapers merely stated in a footnote 
that Pell and Saxbe “are distinguishable in the sense that they were concerned with pe-
nal institutions which, by definition, are not ‘open’ or public places.” 448 U.S. at 576 n.11. 
Justice Brennan mentions in his concurring opinion that “the First Amendment has not 
been viewed by the Court in all settings as providing an equally categorical assurance of 
the correlative freedom of access to information.” Id. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted). Several commentators have criticized the Court’s failure to reconcile 
its prior case law adequately. See, e.g., Leonard G. Leverson, Constitutional Limits on the 
Power to Restrict Access to Prisons: An Historical Re-Examination, 18 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
Rev. 409, 438 (1983) (noting that Richmond Newspapers’ “plurality opinion . . . strained 
noticeably as it attempted to reconcile the Court’s reversal of the trial closure with the 
Court’s previous holdings in Pell and Saxbe”); Lillian R. BeVier, Like Mackerel in the 
Moonlight: Some Reflections on Richmond Newspapers, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 311, 320–24 
(1982) (criticizing Justice Burger for failing to fit new doctrine in with precedent); Archi-
bald Cox, Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 26 
(1980) (stating that “surely, some effort to explain the relation between the decision in 
Richmond Newspapers and those earlier cases was required.”). 
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since 1986.67 Accordingly, the task of developing the doctrine has 
been left to the lower courts.68 All courts considering the issue have 
extended the right of access to civil proceedings, but courts have dis-
agreed as to whether the right applies outside of the judicial context, 
particularly to executive agency proceedings.69 They have also dis-
agreed about what sort of historical “pedigree” satisfies the “history” 
prong of the Richmond Newspapers test, what role the “logic” prong 
plays, and how to balance the two prongs.70 Given such widespread 
disagreement, the applicability of the right of access to nontraditional 
proceedings would be a tricky issue for any court at any time, much 
less during a time of crisis when the government claims that secrecy is 
necessary for national security. 
B. The Freedom of Information Act 
 Although some courts and commentators have argued that the 
First Amendment right of access logically extends to government 
documents, most courts have rejected this view outside the context 
of judicial records. Instead, the public’s right to obtain government 
documents and information is based largely on the Freedom of In-
formation Act, or FOIA.71 The passage of FOIA in 1966 revolution-
ized the public’s ability to force the government to release informa-
tion. In the almost four decades since its creation, however, courts 
have been extremely reluctant to question government assertions 
that national security demands the continued confidentiality of the 
requested information. This has not changed despite congressional 
efforts to amend FOIA in order to encourage greater judicial scrutiny 
of these national security claims. 
 Such deference is hardly novel. At the time of the nation’s found-
ing, executive officials had unfettered discretion to disclose or withhold 
government documents. The Housekeeping Statute of 1789 author-
                                                                                                               
67 See Cerruti, supra note 6, at 263. 
68 Id. 
69 See id. at 263, 266–69. 
70 See id. at 269. 
71 See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 
107–306, 110 Stat. 3048 (2003) (original version at Pub. L No. 89–554 (1966)). The pub-
lic has a common law right of access to government records and documents, including 
judicial documents. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. 435 U.S. 589, 597 
(1978). It is unclear, however, whether FOIA supplanted the common law right of access 
to federal agency documents. Cf. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 
F.3d 918, 936–37 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that FOIA preempted the common law right of 
access to agency information). 
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ized the heads of executive departments to issue regulations concern-
ing the custody, use, and preservation of its records and materials.72 
Agencies typically used this statute to keep documents from the pub-
lic. The statute contained neither a requirement that executive officials 
release any information nor any mechanism for judicial review of non-
disclosure determinations.73 
 During the New Deal and World War II, government bureauc-
racy grew, as did the public’s demand for a more open government. 
In 1946, Congress passed the first legislation that attempted to en-
courage the disclosure of government records.74 Section 3 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) required agencies to disclose 
their procedures, opinions, and records.75 Unfortunately, section 3 
also covered only a limited universe of documents and was riddled 
with vague language. The statute provided a right of access only to 
“persons properly and directly concerned,” and even then only to the 
undefined category of “matters of official record.”76 Even more trou-
bling, agencies were entitled to withhold information if they deter-
mined that secrecy was “in the public interest,” and no remedy ex-
isted for an agency’s wrongful refusal to release information.77 
Agencies relied on both the Housekeeping Act and the APA to justify 
their decisions to withhold information from the public.78 
 In 1958, Congress tried to constrain the executive branch’s right 
to withhold information from the public with an amendment to the 
Housekeeping Statute, which declared that the statute “does not au-
thorize withholding information from the public or limiting the avail-
ability of records to the public.”79 Although the House and Senate 
both passed this amendment unanimously, agencies continued to 
                                                                                                               
72 Ch. 14, § 7, 1 Stat. 68 (1789) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 301(2000)). 
73 See id. When first enacted, the Act provided: “The head of an Executive depart-
ment or military department may prescribe regulations for the government of his depart-
ment, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and 
the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property.” Id. 
74 See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79–404, § 3, 60 Stat. 237, 238 
(1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)). 
75 See id. 
76 See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973). 
77 Id. The APA also permitted “matters of record” to be withheld “for good cause 
found.” § 3(c). 
78 1 James T. O’Reilly, Federal Information Disclosure § 2:2 (3d ed. 2000). 
79 Act of Aug. 12, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85–619, 72 Stat. 547 (amending Rev. Stat. 
§ 161 (1875)) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970)). 
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withhold documents from the public by relying on the limitations of 
section 3 of the APA.80 
 By the end of the 1960s, it was clear that amendments to section 
3 were required to foster openness in government activities.81 Rec-
ognizing that comprehensive standards for disclosure and the right of 
judicial review were necessary in order to provide public access to 
government records, Congress replaced section 3 with FOIA in 
1966.82 
 Under FOIA, the public need not demonstrate a “need to know” 
to gain access to government documents; instead, FOIA creates a 
statutory “right to know.”83 A person requesting documents also 
need not show any particular interest in or need for them; FOIA pro-
tects an individual’s right to obtain documents for any purpose.84 
Unlike its precursor, section 3, FOIA also provides for de novo judi-
cial review of an agency’s decision to withhold documents.85 
 Recognizing the need to strike a balance between the right to 
know and the often compelling need to keep information private, 
Congress structured nine exemptions to FOIA’s mandatory disclo-
sure provisions.86 FOIA itself does not contain a broad “national se-
curity” exemption, but addresses national security directly only in 
                                                                                                               
80 See O’Reilly, supra note 78, § 2:2. 
81 See Mink, 410 U.S. at 79 (explaining that Section 3 “was generally recognized as 
falling far short of its disclosure goals and came to be looked upon more as a withholding 
statute than a disclosure statute”). 
82 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
83 See id. In the original FOIA, any person or entity could make a request for informa-
tion or documents. Id. In 2002, Congress amended FOIA so as to bar requests from foreign 
governments, international governmental organizations, or their representatives for intelli-
gence agency records. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (2002), Pub. 
L. No. 107-306, § 312, 116 Stat. 2390–91 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), (E)) (2000 & 
Supp. 2003)). 
84 See Pub. L. No. 104–231, § 2(a)(1), 110 Stat. 304 (1996) (explaining that the pur-
pose of FOIA is to provide a right of inspection “for any public or private purpose”). 
85 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
86 See id. § 552(b)(1)–(9). The exemptions state that FOIA does not apply to matters 
that fall under the categories of: (1) properly classified information pertaining to national 
defense or foreign policy, (2) internal agency personnel information, (3) information ex-
empted by other statutes, (4) trade secrets and other privileged or confidential business 
information, (5) agency memoranda, (6) personnel, medical, and other information the 
disclosure of which would invade personal privacy, (7) certain categories of law enforce-
ment investigation records or information, (8) reports from regulated financial institutions, 
and (9) geological and geophysical information. Id. 
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Exemption 1, which exempts from disclosure information that has 
been classified pursuant to an Executive order.87 
 In an effort to limit the amount of information that could be with-
held under the vague pre-FOIA “public interest” standard, and to force 
the Executive to be more specific about its reasons for withholding 
information, Exemption 1 excuses from disclosure matters that are 
“specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the inter-
est of the national defense or foreign policy.”88 
 In 1973, the Supreme Court held in EPA v. Mink that when the 
Government claimed that Exemption 1 applied, it had to prove only 
that the document was in fact classified pursuant to an Executive or-
der that protected national defense or foreign policy information.89 
The Court held that the courts could not inquire whether information 
was in fact properly classified or conduct an in camera inspection of 
classified documents to “separate the secret from the supposedly 
nonsecret and order disclosure of the latter.”90 In direct reaction to the 
Court’s decision, Congress amended the national security exemption 
of FOIA in 1974 to make clear that the judiciary should not simply rub-
ber-stamp the Executive’s classification decisions. Congress specifi-
cally designed the amendments to Exemption 1 to empower courts to 
exercise “meaningful judicial review of classification decisions” in order 
to rectify the “widespread overclassification abuses in the use of clas-
sification stamps.”91 The 1974 amendments clearly authorized courts 
to review classified documents in camera for a de novo determination 
of their classification, as well as authorized courts to separate “any 
reasonably segregable portion of a record . . . after deletion of the por-
tions which [were subject to an exemption].”92 Even more signifi-
                                                                                                               
87 See id. § 552(b)(1). Exemption 3 provides that FOIA does not apply to information 
that is exempted from disclosure under a separate statute. Id. § 552(b)(3). These sepa-
rate statutory exemptions often raise national security issues. In addition, FOIA specifi-
cally permits the Federal Bureau of Investigation to exercise its discretion in determining 
whether to disclose documents that “pertain[] to foreign intelligence or counterintelli-
gence, or international terrorism,” provided these documents constitute classified infor-
mation as provided in subsection (b)(1). See id. § 552(c)(3). 
88 Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90–23, § 1, 81 Stat. 54, 55 (amended 1967); see 
S. Rep. 89–813, at 8 (1965). “Exemption No. 1 is for matters specifically required by Ex-
ecutive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. The 
change of standard from ‘in the public interest’ is made both to delimit more narrowly the 
exception and to give it a more precise definition.” Id. 
89 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1973). 
90 Id. 
91 120 Cong. Rec. 17,014, 17,019 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). 
92 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), (b) (2000). 
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cantly, Congress changed Exemption 1’s text: under its amended 
phrasing, documents can be withheld only if they are: “(A) specifically 
authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept 
secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are 
in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.”93 A con-
gressional comment on the exemption’s final text noted that it “per-
mit[s] the withholding of information where it is ‘specifically authorized’ 
. . . and is ‘in fact, properly classified’ pursuant to both procedural and 
substantive criteria contained in such Executive order.”94 
 Although the plain language of FOIA allows courts to review de 
novo the Executive’s decision to withhold information on the basis of 
Exemption 1, and nothing in FOIA requires judicial deference to the 
Executive’s classification decisions, courts nevertheless have uni-
formly deferred to the government’s classification determinations. As 
a result, courts have not rigorously reviewed classified information.95 
In sum, even before September 11, the courts gave extraordinary 
deference to the Executive’s claims that national security concerns 
warranted the secrecy of the requested information.96 
II. The Right of Access after September 11 
 Since September 11, the government has used administrative or 
military proceedings to detain and process individuals allegedly in-
volved in terrorist activities. By proceeding in this way, the government 
has not only been able to deprive detainees of constitutional protec-
tions, such as the right to counsel, but it has also been able to conduct 
its counterterrorism efforts largely outside of public view. So far, efforts 
to force disclosure of information pertaining to the government’s coun-
terterrorism efforts through the First Amendment right of access and 
FOIA have been largely unsuccessful.97 Instead, the public has been 
                                                                                                               
93 See id. 
94 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93–1380, at 11–12 (1974). 
95 See The Honorable Patricia M. Wald, Two Unsolved Constitutional Problems, 49 
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 753, 760 (1988) (noting that judicial review of classified information under 
FOIA “often seems to be done in a perfunctory way”). 
96 See id. at 760–61.  
97 See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003) (denying FOIA request for information pertaining to post-September 11 detain-
ees); N. Jersey Media, 308 F. 3d at 198 (upholding broad closure of removal proceedings 
for detainees); ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2003) (denying 
FOIA request for statistical information regarding the DOJ’s use of Patriot Act surveillance 
authority); ACLU v. County of Hudson, 799 A.2d 629 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) 
(denying access to information concerning detainees held in New Jersey facilities). But 
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forced to rely on the whim of government officials to release informa-
tion when it suits them. Although the government appears to be 
somewhat more forthcoming with information about detained citizens, 
in truth the public’s information remains remarkably one-sided. 
A. Guantanamo Bay, Military Tribunals and Enemy Combatants 
 The United States has detained hundreds of people captured by 
U.S. forces in Afghanistan or neighboring countries in Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba. Many have been held for almost three years without 
charge or access to lawyers.98 The U.S. military has closed most of 
the prison at Guantanamo Bay to reporters and forbidden visitors 
from speaking to detainees.99 Because of the government’s failure 
to allow meaningful access to the detainees, the public knows little 
about who is detained at Guantanamo Bay or on what basis. Al-
though international political pressure has compelled the United 
States to release some detainees in the past year, hundreds more 
essentially remain in secret detention.100 This high level of secrecy 
                                                                                                               
see Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding broad closure of 
removal proceedings violated the First Amendment). A federal district court recently or-
dered various government agencies to respond to a FOIA request for information about 
detainees in United States custody. ACLU v. Dep’t of Defense, 339 F. Supp. 2d 501, 2004 
WL 2050921 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2004). The agencies had failed to give any meaningful 
response to the request, which had been made almost a year earlier. The district court 
rebuked the government, noting that “the glacial pace at which defendant agencies have 
been responding to plaintiff’s requests shows an indifference to the commands of FOIA, 
and fails to afford accountability of government that the act requires.” Id. at *3. 
98 John Mintz, U.S. Charges 2 as Bin Laden Aides, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 2004, at 
A1. 
99 See Scott Higham et al., Guantanamo, Wash. Post, May 2, 2004, at A1. 
100 See Associated Press, U.S. Releases 26 Guantanamo Detainees, Wash. Post, 
Mar. 16, 2004, at A2 (reporting release of twenty-six detainees); Peter Baker, U.S. Sends 
to Russia 7 Held at Guantanamo, Wash. Post, Mar. 2, 2004, at A14 (discussing release 
of seven Russians); Higham, et al., supra note 99 (noting that detainee releases resulted 
from political pressure and that, despite releases, 600 detainees remain at Guantanamo); 
John Mintz, U.S. Faces Quandary in Freeing Detainees, Wash. Post, Mar. 22, 2004, at 
A1 (mentioning international law experts’ suggestions that U.S. allies have advantage in 
securing release of their detainees); Pierre-Antoine Souchard, 4 Frenchmen Freed from 
Guantanamo, Wash. Post, July 28, 2004, at A11 (discussing release of four French pris-
oners and noting the slow release of prisoners after much international criticism); Don 
Van Natta, Jr. & Tim Golden, Officials Detail a Detainee Deal by 3 Countries, N.Y. Times, 
July 4, 2004, at A1 (noting U.S. release of five Saudi Arabian detainees in exchange for 
the release of British prisoners); Washington in Brief, Wash. Post, Apr. 3, 2004, at A11 
(reporting that the United States had released an additional 15 detainees from different 
countries). In May 2004, the United States announced that it planned to conduct periodic 
reviews of the detention of enemy combatants held in South Carolina and Guantanamo 
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is disconcerting, especially given reports that many of the detainees 
have no connection to terrorism and have been subject to abusive 
treatment.101 
 After the recent Supreme Court decisions holding that detainees 
are entitled to challenge their enemy combatant status through ha-
beas petitions filed in federal district court,102 the U.S. military has 
initiated “Combatant Status Review” hearings in Guantanamo Bay. 
Attorneys for the detainees have charged that the military estab-
lished these proceedings in the hopes of avoiding federal habeas 
proceedings and public scrutiny.103 In these hearings, the detainees 
may testify and present witnesses who are deemed “reasonably 
available,” but they are afforded no access to counsel.104 Instead, 
they are permitted to meet with a “personal representative,” an Army 
officer who is neither a lawyer nor bound by attorney-client privi-
lege.105 The detainees also bear the burden of rebutting the pre-
sumption that they are in fact enemy combatants, while having no 
access to any of the classified evidence that allegedly supports that 
designation.106  
 The regulations for the status hearings make no mention of pub-
lic access, and the hearings that have been held so far have been 
open to only a few members of the press.107 The military has de-
clared further its unwillingness to release the detainees’ names or 
any other information it deems to be sensitive.108 
 The Combatant Status Review proceedings are distinct from trials 
to be conducted by the military commissions President Bush estab-
                                                                                                               
Bay. See John Mintz, U.S. to Review Detainees’ Cases, Wash. Post, May 19, 2004, at 
A18. These reviews would be conducted by a three-judge military panel. Id. 
101 Neil A. Lewis, Broad Use of Harsh Tactics Is Described at Cuba Base, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 17, 2004, at A1. 
102 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2644 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 
2686, 2692 (2004). 
103 Josh White, U.S. to Tell Detainees of Rights: Pentagon Outlines New Proce-
dures, Wash. Post, July 10, 2004, at A7. 
104 Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the Navy, 
Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal 1–3 (July 7, 2004), available at http:// 
www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. 
105 Id. at 1. 
106 See Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, supra note 104, at 2, 
3. 
107 Neil A. Lewis, Scrutiny of Review Tribunals as War Crimes Trials Open, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 24, 2004, at A12. 
108 See Ian James, Tribunal Weighs Guantanamo Detainee Cases, A.P. Newswires, 
Aug. 4, 2004. 
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lished in November 2001.109 Preliminary proceedings for military trials 
have begun only recently, and only for four of the several hundred de-
tainees.110 President Bush instituted the military commissions to 
prosecute noncitizens who are allegedly members of al-Qaeda or have 
“engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of interna-
tional terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor.”111 When announcing 
the creation of the military tribunals, President Bush declared that in 
view of the terrorist threat, “it is not practicable to apply in military 
commissions under this order the principles of law . . . generally recog-
nized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district 
courts.”112 One such principle is the general presumption that trials 
are open to the press and public. After considerable public outcry, the 
Department of Defense released significantly modified regulations for 
the military trials entitling the detainees to a number of civil rights crimi-
nal defendants enjoy, including the right to an open trial.113 The regu-
lations give the presiding officer broad discretion to close the proceed-
ings on a number of grounds, however, and they provide no 
mechanism for the press or public to challenge a closure order.114 Any 
members of the press or human rights groups attending the trials must 
sign a five-page list of “ground rules” that permit the government to ex-
ercise a measure of control over the information released to the pub-
                                                                                                               
109 See James, supra note 108; Lewis, supra note 107. 
110 Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Terrorism Tribunals Set to Begin Work, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 
2004, at 22. Lawyers for the detainees have made preliminary motions challenging the 
tribunals that are expected to delay the start of the trials themselves until December. See 
Neil A. Lewis, Guantanamo Tribunal Process in Turmoil, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 2004, at 
29. A military official recently revealed to the New York Times that the first four detainees 
facing trial were chosen specifically because they had not been subjected to abusive 
treatment and would therefore be less likely to make any allegations embarrassing for the 
government. See Lewis, supra note 101. 
111 See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 16, 2001). 
112 Press Release, White House, President Issues Military Order (Nov. 13, 2001), at 
http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/print/20011113–27.html. 
113 See Dep’t of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1, § 6(B)(3) (Mar. 21, 
2002), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/mco1.pdf. 
114 See id. The regulations permit the presiding officer to close the hearings for any 
number of reasons, including the following grounds: “protection of information classified or 
classifiable . . . information protected by law or rule from unauthorized disclosure; the physi-
cal safety of participants in Commission proceedings, including prospective witnesses; intel-
ligence and law enforcement sources, methods, or activities; and other national security 
interests.” Id. Whether the public and press will be able to challenge the closure of a military 
tribunal in United States courts is an open question. For a discussion of this issue, see The 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Military Tribunals, in Homefront Confiden-
tial (4th ed. 2003), available at http://www.rcfp.org/homefrontconfidential/tribunals.html. 
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lic.115 For example, observers may release neither the identities of the 
detainees nor the identities of any commission personnel (including the 
commission members, prosecutors, or defense counsel) without ap-
proval; many detainees, however, have already been identified.116 
 No U.S. citizens are subject to trial before a military commission, 
for the order establishing the tribunals explicitly excludes U.S. citi-
zens.117 As several scholars have argued, the decision to exclude 
citizens from military tribunals appears politically motivated and lacks 
a rational basis.118 The government initially planned to prosecute 
U.S. citizens in federal court, as it did with the “American Taliban” 
John Walker Lindh.119 But when faced with the difficulties of justify-
ing its prolonged detention of Hamdi and Padilla, the Department of 
Justice removed them from the criminal justice system altogether, 
labeling them “enemy combatants” who, the government claimed, 
could be held indefinitely. 120 
 Although the United States detained Hamdi and Padilla in secret 
military custody without the ordinary protections of the criminal justice 
                                                                                                               
115 See Charlie Savage, Guantanamo Coverage to Be Restricted, Boston Globe, 
Aug. 27, 2004, at A9; Press Kit, Media Ground Rules for Coverage of Military Commis-
sions (May 2004), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d20040818PK.pdf. 
116 See Press Kit, supra note 115. Using non-governmental sources, the Washington 
Post has compiled a list of the names of 367 detainees. See Names of the Detained in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/guantanamo_names.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2004). 
117 Detention, Treatment, and Trial, supra note 111, at 57,834. 
118 See, e.g., David Cole, Their Liberties, Our Security: Democracy and Double Stan-
dards, 31 Int’l J. Legal Info. 290, 299 (2003) (arguing that excluding citizens from military 
tribunals was likely “a politically opportunistic decision”); George P. Fletcher, On Justice and 
War: Contradictions in the Proposed Military Tribunals, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 635, 646 
(2002) (commenting that “[n]ot only does the lumping together of all foreigners vastly ex-
ceed standards of relevance, but it also invokes a method of classification—citizen versus 
foreigner— that has no reasonable bearing on the supposed objective of protecting the 
United States against international terrorism.”); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging 
War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 Yale L.J. 1259, 1298–1303 (2002) 
(arguing that the citizen/noncitizen distinction violates the Equal Protection Clause and is a 
distinction that “cannot be understood in immigration or international bargaining terms”). 
119 See ‘I Made a Mistake by Joining the Taliban’: Apologetic Lindh Gets 20 Years, 
Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 2002, at A1. 
120 Dan Eggen & Susan Schmidt, ‘Dirty Bomb’ Plot Uncovered, U.S. Says: Suspected 
Al Qaeda Operative Held as ‘Enemy Combatant’, Wash. Post, June 11, 2002, at A1 (report-
ing that Padilla was named an enemy combatant after prosecutors determined that a crimi-
nal prosecution would be “difficult”); John Mintz, Justice Says It Won’t Charge U.S. Citizen 
Moved From Cuba: Man in Custody as Government Deliberates What to Do, Wash. Post, 
Apr. 9 2002, at A10 (reporting that the government did not intend to charge Hamdi because 
it lacked sufficient evidence for a criminal prosecution). 
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system, the United States has voluntarily released some information 
about both individuals. At the outset, the government revealed their 
identities and some of the circumstances of their arrest, which was far 
more than it was willing to do for the noncitizens held in Guan-
tanamo.121 The Department of Justice also did not challenge Hamdi’s 
or Padilla’s right to file a habeas petition, as it did for the Guantanamo 
Bay detainees. Instead, the Department of Justice submitted declara-
tions detailing the circumstances of Hamdi’s and Padilla’s capture and 
basis for detention.122 In addition, on June 1, 2004, when a decision 
from the U.S. Supreme Court on their habeas petitions was imminent, 
the Department of Justice spokesman James Comey held a press 
conference to provide Padilla’s “full story” in an effort to “allow the 
American people to understand the threat he posed, and also under-
stand that the [P]resident’s decision was and continues to be essential 
to the protection of the American people.”123 Comey quite candidly 
noted that a primary reason for the release of information about 
Padilla was his citizenship status, stating that “[p]eople are right to 
question when the [P]resident of the United States orders the military 
detention of an American citizen in the United States. And I very much 
wanted to have some of the answers for folks. And now we do.”124 
 But the government’s apparent eagerness to provide information 
about the U.S. citizens in its custody is deceptive. In actuality, the 
public’s knowledge about Hamdi and Padilla is strikingly skewed. By 
removing them from the criminal judicial system, the government ef-
fectively curtailed the public scrutiny that accompanies criminal trials. 
Labeled as enemy combatants and deprived of access to their attor-
neys for the first two years of their captivity, Hamdi and Padilla have 
                                                                                                               
121 See Transcript of News Conference on Jose Padilla (June 1, 2004), at http://www. 
cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/01/comey.padilla.transcript/index.html. Indeed, Hamdi, who had 
been initially detained in Guantanamo, was not identified until military officials discovered he 
was a U.S. citizen. Jess Bravin & Greg Jaffe, American Prisoner in Cuba to Be Moved, Wall 
St. J., Apr. 5, 2002, at B2. 
122 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2636–37 (2004); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 
F.3d 695, 700–01 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). 
123 See Transcript of News Conference on Jose Padilla, supra note 121. Comey ex-
plained, “We have decided to release this information to help people understand why we 
are doing what we’re doing in the war on terror and to help people understand the nature 
of the threat we face . . . .” Id. “I’m [releasing this information] as soon as it was done so 
that in the court of public opinion people could better understand why we’ve done some 
of the things we’ve done.” Id. 
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been unable to respond to the government’s allegations.125 Indeed, 
even once they were permitted to speak to counsel, their attorneys 
were forbidden to convey anything the detainees said to the public 
because the government deemed their communications classi-
fied.126 In light of the government’s continued assertion that it was 
entitled to keep Hamdi detained indefinitely and incommunicado, it is 
quite extraordinary that, within two months of the Supreme Court’s 
decision holding that Hamdi was entitled to a meaningful opportunity 
to rebut the basis for his detention, the government announced that 
an agreement for his release was imminent.127 And even more curi-
ous is that after Hamdi’s release, the government has continued to 
shroud his case with secrecy by refusing to explain why he no longer 
posed a threat to national security.128 
 The government has also attempted to limit the amount of infor-
mation released about John Walker Lindh, an American citizen who 
ultimately pled guilty to assisting the Taliban.129 Before his indict-
ment, he was held incommunicado as an enemy combatant for fifty-
four days, despite his request for counsel and his parents’ numerous 
attempts to contact him.130 When Lindh was indicted on ten different 
counts, for which he faced the possibility of three life sentences, Attor-
ney General John Ashcroft declared that he was an “an al Qaeda 
trained terrorist who conspired with the Taliban to kill his fellow citi-
zens.”131 Within months, however, nine of the ten charges were 
                                                                                                               
125 See Michael Powell, Padilla Case Puts Lawyers in Limbo, Too, Wash. Post, 
June 5, 2004, at A3. 
126 Id. 
127 See Sonja Barisic, Lawyers Work to Free Former Combatant, (Aug. 11, 2004), at 
http:// 
www.boston.com (Boston Globe online). Even after the Justice Department admitted that 
Hamdi was no longer a national security threat to the United States, the government con-
tinued to hold him incommunicado in solitary confinement. See Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Set 
Back on Treatment of Combatant, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 2004, at A13. In September 2004, 
the government and Hamdi’s lawyers reached an agreement for his release. Eric Licht-
blau, U.S., Bowing to Court Ruling, Will Free ‘Enemy Combatant,’ N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 
2004, at A1. 
128 Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia: U.S. Citizen’s Detention as En-
emy Combatant Sparked Fierce Debate, Wash. Post, Oct. 12, 2004, at A2. A Pentagon 
statement explained merely that it could not give any details “because of operational and 
security considerations.” Id. 
129 See ‘I Made a Mistake by Joining the Taliban’, supra note 119. 
130 Jane Mayer, Lost in the Jihad, New Yorker, Mar. 10, 2003, at 50, 57. 
131Attorney General Transcript, News Conference—Indictment of John Walker Lindh 
(Feb. 5, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/020502transcriptindictmentof 
johnwalkerlindh.htm. 
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dropped, and a plea agreement reached.132 Despite the apparent 
disintegration of the government’s case against Lindh, many docu-
ments involved in the case remain classified, and Lindh himself has 
been forbidden from speaking to the media.133 
 Although the government professes greater willingness to re-
lease information about American citizens detained as terrorists, the 
reality is that the public still has very little information about them. By 
establishing military tribunals and labeling individuals as “enemy 
combatants,” the government has sought to avoid public scrutiny of 
its counterterrorism efforts that would otherwise be available through 
the First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings. 
B. Administrative Proceedings 
 Within seven weeks after the September 11 attacks, the govern-
ment had detained over a thousand aliens as part of its counterterror-
ism investigation. In an effort to keep information about these detain-
ees secret, Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued a 
directive to all U.S. immigration judges ordering heightened security 
measures in “special interest” cases.134 The Creppy Directive offered 
no definition of this “special interest” category, but the Department of 
Justice indicated in litigation that the category included removal pro-
ceedings for aliens who “‘might have connections with, or possess in-
formation pertaining to, terrorist activities against the United 
States.’”135 In practice, the government applied this category to all 
aliens rounded up during the post-September 11 investigation, regard-
less of whether actual evidence existed that they had been involved in 
terrorist activities. The Creppy Directive required judges to close the 
hearings to the public, with “no visitors, no family, and no press,” and 
                                                                                                               
132 Mayer, supra note 130, at 50. 
133Id. 
134 See Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge of the 
United States, to Immigration Judges and Court Administrators 1 (Sept. 21, 2001), avail-
able at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf. Under the Im-
migration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General has authority over the “administration 
and enforcement” of all “laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens.” 
Immigration Act § 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2000). Removal proceedings, conducted by 
immigration judges in the executive branch, must follow regulations the Attorney General 
prescribes. See id. (giving Attorney General power to establish regulations which he 
deems necessary). Since 1964, an Attorney General regulation governing access to re-
moval and other administrative proceedings permits the closure of hearings to protect 
“witnesses, parties, or the public interest.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 (2004) (modern codifica-
tion). 
135 See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 202 (quoting declaration of Dale L. Watson). 
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to neither confirm nor deny whether a particular case was even on the 
docket.136 As one court described it, the Creppy Directive amounted 
to “a complete information blackout along both substantive and proce-
dural dimensions.”137 
 Various media and public interest groups attempted to obtain in-
formation about those noncitizens living in the United States who were 
detained in the aftermath of September 11. In one set of cases, they 
sought access to the detainees’ immigration hearings, arguing that the 
Creppy Directive violated the First Amendment right of access.138 In 
another case, parties challenged the government’s refusal to honor 
their FOIA request for basic information about the post-September 11 
detainees, including their names, date of arrest, and place of deten-
tion.139 Appellate courts reviewing the government’s national security 
secrecy claims reached mixed results, and the Supreme Court de-
clined to review the issue. As a consequence, the public still has very 
little information about the identity and processing of these individuals. 
1. Challenges to Closure of “Special Interest” Immigration Hearings 
 Two federal appellate courts—the Third and the Sixth Circuits— 
examined the First Amendment challenges to the Creppy Directive 
and reached opposite results.140 Although both courts agreed that 
the Richmond Newspapers history-and-logic test applied to the re-
moval proceedings, the Sixth Circuit applied the test and concluded 
that the presumptive right of access attached, while the Third Circuit 
concluded that it did not.141 
 In response to the First Amendment challenges to the Creppy 
Directive, the government argued that the “[c]losure of removal pro-
ceedings in special interest cases is necessary to protect national 
security by safeguarding the Government’s investigation of the Sep-
tember 11 terrorist attack and other terrorist conspiracies.”142 Spe-
cifically, the government maintained that disclosing the names of the 
                                                                                                               
136 Id. at 203. 
137 Id. Regulations also permit government attorneys to submit information under 
seal to the immigration judge, who is required to give “appropriate deference” to the gov-
ernment’s contention that disclosure of the documents would harm national security. 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.46 (2004). 
138 N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 203–04. 
139 Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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681, 710–11 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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142 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705. 
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“special interest” detainees would enable possible terrorists to com-
pile seemingly innocuous information and create a “mosaic” that 
would reveal the direction, patterns, and progress of the investiga-
tion; this mosaic would thus reveal which terrorist cells had been 
compromised and which ports of entry were most dangerous.143 
 Both the Third and Sixth Circuits agreed that the two-pronged 
history-and-logic test dictated the relevant inquiry for determining 
whether there is a constitutional right of access to deportation hear-
ings.144 The courts rejected the government’s argument that the 
Executive’s plenary power over immigration required deference on 
“all facets of immigration law” as long as they are “facially legitimate 
and bona fide,” noting that this deference was appropriate only to the 
Executive’s promulgation of substantive immigration laws, not rules 
of procedure implicating constitutional rights.145 The courts also re-
jected the government’s contention that Richmond Newspapers ap-
plied only to criminal proceedings, emphasizing that a removal pro-
ceeding is an adversarial process that closely resembles a judicial 
trial.146 
 It was in the application of the Richmond Newspapers test, how-
ever, where the courts’ agreement ended. The Sixth Circuit applied the 
                                                                                                               
143 See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 203; Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705–06, 
709. The government also argued that (1) terrorist organizations might intimidate or harm 
investigative sources and potential witnesses associated with the detainee; (2) the detain-
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dealing with detainees known to be in government custody; (3) verifying that an individual is 
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organizations might interfere with the proceedings by creating false or misleading evidence; 
and (5) detainees who do not actually have any connection to terrorism would be stigma-
tized. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705–06. 
144 See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 208–09 (holding that Richmond Newspapers 
“is a test broadly applicable to issues of access to government proceedings, including 
removal”); Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 694, 700 (rejecting the government’s argument 
that a more deferential standard for non-adjudicative proceedings applied). 
145 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 685, 686 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 
U.S. 753, 770 (1972)); see id. at 692–93. 
146 See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 207, 208–09; Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 
698–99. The Detroit Free Press opinion notes that immigration hearings commence with 
a “complaint-like pleading”; “the government bears the burden of establishing its allega-
tions by ‘clear and convincing evidence’”; the respondent has the right of counsel of his 
own choosing and the right to be present at the hearing; the respondent may assert af-
firmative defenses or seek discretionary relief; the “immigration judge cannot have par-
ticipated in the same case in an investigative or prosecutorial role”; and a removal order 
“must be based on reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.” Detroit Free Press, 
303 F.3d at 698–99. As one court noted, “Deportation hearings ‘walk, talk, and squawk’ 
very much like a judicial proceeding.” Id. at 702. 
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history-and-logic test and concluded that there was a constitutional 
right of access to the deportation hearings, and that the government 
had not met its burden of showing the closure order was narrowly tai-
lored to address the government’s compelling interest in national se-
curity.147 In contrast, the Third Circuit determined that there was not 
even a presumptive right of access to “special interest” deportation 
hearings because they failed both prongs of the history-and-logic in-
quiry.148 
 The courts’ disagreement first centered on whether removal pro-
ceedings had a sufficient tradition of openness to satisfy the history 
prong. The Sixth Circuit found that “[a]lthough exceptions may have 
been allowed, the general policy has been one of openness.”149 The 
court noted that no immigration statute had ever required closure, and 
that since 1965, INS regulations have provided explicitly for presump-
tively open proceedings.150 The court took notice of historical evi-
dence that some deportation hearings were conducted in prisons, 
hospitals, and homes, but discounted these hearings as rare excep-
tions.151 The Third Circuit, in contrast, placed much more emphasis 
on these exceptions, and concluded that the history of openness of 
deportation hearings “has neither the pedigree nor uniformity neces-
sary to satisfy Richmond Newspapers’ first prong.”152 
 Although the Third Circuit’s conclusion concerning the history of 
openness of deportation proceedings is debatable in light of the 
longstanding confusion concerning the application of the test,153 its 
                                                                                                               
147 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700, 705. 
148 N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 221. 
149 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 703. 
152 See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 209. The court noted that “there is also evi-
dence that, in practice, deportation hearings have frequently been closed to the general 
public.” Id. at 212. 
153 See Kathleen K. Olson, Courtroom Access After 9/11: A Pathological Perspec-
tive, 7 Comm. L. & Pol’y 461, 487–88 (2002) (explaining that given the general confusion 
surrounding the application of the history-and-logic test, particularly to administrative 
proceedings, “[p]redicting how the Richmond Newspapers test would apply in [INS pro-
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determine whether a proceeding satisfies the history prong. See N. Jersey Media, 308 
F.3d at 213 (noting that it appears a 1000-year history is unnecessary, but the 38-year 
history of open removal hearings was too short). Others have noted that the Third Cir-
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“history” prong satisfied on a lesser showing. See Lauren Gilbert, When Democracy Dies 
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analysis of the logic prong was truly unprecedented. The Sixth Cir-
cuit approached the logic inquiry in a traditional manner and con-
cluded that its requirements were met in the context of deportation 
hearings.154 The court emphasized that public scrutiny was particu-
larly important in immigration proceedings because in that area “the 
government has nearly unlimited authority, [and] the press and the 
public serve as perhaps the only check on abusive government prac-
tices.”155 In addition, after September 11, openness has particularly 
significant “cathartic” effect by serving as an outlet for the hostility 
and high emotions resulting from the terrorist attacks.156 
 The Third Circuit, in contrast, voiced frustration that the “logic” 
prong did not do much “work,” noting that it could not identify a case 
where the proceedings passed the history test but failed the logic 
test.157 The court concluded that the logic prong therefore must re-
quire consideration of not only whether openness can play a positive 
role, but also whether openness could “impair[] the public good.”158 
The court emphasized that “in the wake of September 11, 2001, a day 
on which American life changed drastically and dramatically . . . the 
primary national policy must be self-preservation.”159 The Third Cir-
cuit summarized the reasons the government gave for closing all “spe-
cial interest” deportation hearings—with no discussion of whether the 
government assertions were reasonable or credible—and held that 
the government had met its burden of presenting substantial evidence 
that a presumption of open hearings could threaten national secu-
rity.160 The Third Circuit conceded that the government’s showing of 
national security risk was “to some degree speculative,” but concluded 
that “[w]e are quite hesitant to conduct a judicial inquiry into the credi-
bility of these security concerns, as national security is an area where 
courts have traditionally extended great deference to Executive exper-
tise.”161 
 The Sixth Circuit was far more skeptical of the government’s na-
tional security argument. First, the court considered whether govern-
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ment had met its burden of rebutting the presumption that the right of 
access applied. To meet its burden, the government was required to 
show that not only its compelling interest in closure, but also that the 
broad Creppy Directive was narrowly tailored to serve this interest.162 
The Sixth Circuit accepted that the government had a compelling in-
terest in preventing terrorism, and that the government’s “mosaic” ar-
gument had possible merit—that is, that terrorists could take “[b]its 
and pieces of information that may appear innocuous in isolation” and 
piece them together “to help form a ‘bigger picture’ of the govern-
ment’s terrorism investigation.”163 The court concluded, however, that 
the government had not demonstrated that the Creppy order was nar-
rowly tailored to serve its national security interests, or that “no less 
restrictive alternative would serve the government’s purpose.”164 The 
court explained that the government had failed to demonstrate why 
immigration judges could not evaluate closure requests on a case-by-
case basis, employing in camera proceedings when necessary.165 
The court also rejected the government’s argument that divulging 
merely the detainees’ names would provide too much information to 
potential terrorists, noting that the detainees and their lawyers were 
already free to disclose their identities to the public.166 The court also 
remarked that potential terrorists capable of “sophisticated intelligence-
gathering” would certainly be aware that one of their operatives was 
missing and possibly in government custody.167 In addition, the court 
rejected the government’s categorical invocation of the “mosaic intelli-
gence” theory.168 The court explained that if it accepted this argument, 
the government would be allowed to use national security as justifica-
tion for closing any public hearing, including criminal proceedings.169 
The court was particularly concerned about accepting a “mosaic” the-
ory in the situation at hand, given that the government had failed to ex-
plain the standards or procedures used to designate a particular depor-
tation hearing as a “special interest” hearing.170 
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 Despite conflicting conclusions in the lower courts, the Supreme 
Court declined to review the constitutionality of the Creppy Direc-
tive.171 One possible reason for this decision was the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s representation to the Court that the Creppy Directive was no 
longer in effect and that the issue of its constitutionality was therefore 
moot.172 
2. Request for Detainee Information Under FOIA 
 Frustrated in their attempts to gain access to the “special interest” 
deportation proceedings, the Center for National Security Studies, the 
American Civil Liberties Union, and twenty-one other public interest 
organizations committed to human rights and civil liberties issues filed 
a FOIA request to make public the identities of the detainees and their 
attorneys, dates of arrest and release, locations of arrest and deten-
tion, and the reasons for detention. To support their request, the plain-
tiffs submitted press reports that “raised serious questions about ‘dep-
rivations of fundamental due process, including imprisonment without 
probable cause, interference with the right to counsel, and threats of 
serious bodily injury.’”173 In response, the government indicated that 
the detainees fell into three categories: (1) individuals criminally 
charged; (2) individuals held on immigration charges; and (3) material 
witnesses.174 The Department of Justice agreed to release a small 
portion of the requested information concerning the few detainees who 
had been criminally charged. With respect to the immigration detain-
ees, however, the government refused to reveal their names, the 
names of their counsel, the dates of arrest, any filed charges, or the 
                                                                                                               
171 See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 198. 
172 See Devlin Barrett, Abuse of Detainees Spurs Homeland Changes, Monterey Her-
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dates on which any of the detainees had been released.175 The gov-
ernment refused to disclose any information at all about the material 
witnesses.176 The requesters filed suit in federal district court in the 
District of Columbia challenging the Department’s withholding deci-
sion.177 
 In opposing the lawsuit, the government claimed that the detainee 
information was exempt from disclosure under FOIA because its re-
lease would interfere with the government’s counterterrorism efforts. 
Throughout its brief, the government emphasized that the court must 
defer to the Executive’s determination that releasing the information 
would pose a threat to national security.178 Like the Creppy Directive, 
which applied indiscriminately to post-September 11 detainees, the 
Department of Justice’s response to the FOIA request did not distin-
guish between the detainees who had been found to have terrorist 
connections and those who did not; instead, the Department asserted 
that the information needed to be protected under a “mosaic” the-
ory.179 
 Although the government claimed that “national security” concerns 
required the nondisclosure of detainee information, the government did 
not claim that this information was exempt from disclosure under Ex-
emption 1. As explained above, Exemption 1 applies only to informa-
tion that has been properly classified pursuant to an Executive order. 
Because information about the post-September 11 detainees had not 
been classified, the government could not invoke that exemption. In-
stead, the government claimed that the detainee information was ex-
empt from disclosure under FOIA pursuant to Exemptions 7(A), (C), 
and (F).180 These exemptions permit the withholding of information 
“compiled for law enforcement proceedings” when disclosure “(A) 
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy, . . . (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, [or] . . . (F) could reasonably 
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be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individ-
ual.181  
 The D.C. Circuit rejected the request for detainee information.182 
Just as the Third Circuit created an exemption to the First Amendment 
right of access for national security matters, the D.C. Circuit essentially 
created a “national security” exception to FOIA. The court explained 
that the appropriateness of judicial deference to the Executive “de-
pends on the substance of the danger posed by disclosure—that is, 
harm to the national security—not the FOIA exemption invoked.183 At 
several points throughout its opinion, the D.C. Circuit reiterated the im-
portance of judicial deference to the Executive when national security 
matters are at issue.184 The court appeared concerned, as the gov-
ernment repeatedly warned in its brief,185 that grave consequences 
would result if the court released the requested information about the 
detainees. The majority noted that “[t]he need for deference in this 
case is just as strong as in earlier cases. America faces an enemy just 
as real as its former Cold War foes, with capabilities beyond the capac-
ity of the judiciary to explore.”186 Just as the Third Circuit did in North 
Jersey Media, the D.C. Circuit concluded that when national security 
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matters are implicated, it would be “unwise to undertake searching ju-
dicial review.”187 
 Applying this extremely deferential mode of analysis, the court 
accepted as “reasonable” the government’s argument that releasing 
the names of all the post-September 11 detainees would enable po-
tential terrorists to map the counterterrorism investigation and de-
velop ways to impede it.188 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argu-
ment that terrorist organizations most likely know which of its 
members have been detained, stating that it had “no way of assess-
ing that likelihood” and that even if it did, “a complete list of detainees 
could still have great value in confirming the status of their mem-
bers.”189 A terrorist group might not know that one of its members 
had been detained briefly and released, and if it learned that informa-
tion, “this detainee could be irreparably compromised as a source of 
information.”190 In addition, the court explained, a released detainee 
might not be a member of a terrorist group but merely have informa-
tion about terrorists who are members of their mosques or commu-
nity groups.191 These individuals will be less likely to cooperate with 
officials if their names are released, and terrorist groups might at-
tempt to intimidate these individuals or feed them false or misleading 
information.192 The Court also noted that future potential informants 
are less likely to come forward if they believe their identities will be 
revealed.193 
 At a pivotal moment in its opinion, the majority seized on the 
vague assertion in a government declaration that “concerns re-
main[ed]” about the detainees’ links to terrorism to leap to the conclu-
sion that in fact “many of the detainees have links to terrorism.”194 The 
court added that “[t]his comes as no surprise given that the detainees 
were apprehended during the course of a terrorism investigation, and 
given that several detainees have been charged with federal terrorism 
crimes or held as enemy combatants.”195 The court disregarded the 
fact that, as of the time the FOIA suit was filed, only one detainee out of 
1,182 had been criminally charged in connection with the September 
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11 attacks, and ignored as well the government’s concession that 
many of the detainees included individuals proven to have no connec-
tion with terrorist activity and “no information useful to the investiga-
tion.”196 
 The majority also agreed with the government’s contention that 
disclosing the names of the detainees’ attorneys, or the dates and lo-
cations of arrest, detention, and release for each would have the same 
potentially “disastrous” consequences as releasing the names of the 
detainees themselves.197 The court predicted that the press would talk 
to the attorneys to compile information about the detainees, and that 
the remaining information concerning the date and place of their ar-
rest, detention, and release “would provide a chronological and geo-
graphical picture of the government investigation,” allowing terrorists 
to “derive conclusions as to how [to] more adequately secure their 
clandestine operations in future terrorist undertakings.”198 The Su-
preme Court declined to review the D.C. Circuit’s ruling.199 
 The D.C. Circuit opinion in Center for National Security Studies 
exacerbates a longstanding tendency of the courts to defer to the Ex-
ecutive’s classification decisions. Even before the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, courts and commentators had lamented the judiciary’s 
excessive deference to the Executive’s classification decisions. The 
text of FOIA makes clear that all decisions to withhold information from 
the public must be reviewed “de novo.” Affording broad, almost con-
clusive deference to the Executive’s decisions regarding the disclo-
sure of information whenever the Executive asserts a “national secu-
rity” need for secrecy—whether for classified information subject to 
Exemption 1 or not—is contrary to Congress’s clear intention, and re-
turns the public’s right of access to its unfortunate status before FOIA, 
when the Executive could withhold information on the basis of his un-
reviewable determination that it was “in the public interest” to do so. 
III. The Threat to the Right to Know 
 Although the Third and D.C. Circuits were evaluating different 
claims—respectively, the First Amendment right of access and 
FOIA— the cases are remarkably similar in a number of ways. Most 
obviously, the two courts considered whether the public should be 
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given access to essentially the same information about the post-9/11 
detainees, and in doing so, both courts had to evaluate the govern-
ment claims that such access would threaten national security.200 
Beneath the surface, the two decisions also reflected deeper misgiv-
ings as to the value of the right of access, particularly when the gov-
ernment alleges that releasing the information could harm national 
security, and even more so when that information concerns nonciti-
zens, a group historically suspect in times of war. 
A. Amplification of Pre-Existing Doctrinal Confusion 
 The Third and D.C. Circuits’ decisions reflect the judiciary’s his-
toric hostility to the right of access under FOIA and the First Amend-
ment, particularly when the information sought allegedly concerns 
national security. Both rights are relatively new, and throughout their 
brief history the courts have demonstrated a persistent reluctance to 
question the Executive’s claims that national security requires se-
crecy. 
 Given the Court’s failure to reconcile Richmond Newspapers with 
its prior decisions, it is not surprising that the lower courts have dis-
agreed about whether the First Amendment right of access applies 
outside of judicial proceedings. Some courts have held that Richmond 
Newspapers has no application to the executive and legislative 
branches, holding that in such cases the applicable rule is that of the 
Houchins plurality— that the First Amendment does not guarantee a 
right of access to government information.201 Although the Third Cir-
cuit rejected the government’s argument that Richmond Newspapers 
did not apply to immigration proceedings, its utter failure to recognize 
the importance of the right of access is the same as that expressed in 
the majority and plurality decisions in Pell, Houchins, and Saxbe.202 
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 Even more dramatically, the differences between the Third and 
Sixth Circuit opinions demonstrate the difficulties of applying the “his-
tory-and-logic” test outside of the context of a judicial proceeding. 
The first problematic prong is the “history” inquiry. Although Rich-
mond Newspapers noted that the history of open criminal trials ex-
tended from the time of the Norman Conquest to the present, often 
no historical analog is available for consideration, or the history of 
openness is limited or mixed.203 As a result, most courts have held 
that a history of openness with the same pedigree of a criminal trial 
is not necessary to satisfy the history prong. Instead, as one profes-
sor noted, “some [courts] have drawn analogies with established 
proceedings or have examined the history, however short, of the 
specific proceeding at issue.”204 Others have discounted the impor-
tance of a historical tradition altogether and instead emphasized the 
logic prong and the structural value of access, thus extending the 
right of access to proceedings possessing very little history at all, 
including administrative proceedings such as unemployment benefit 
hearings and fact-finding hearings of the federal Mine Safety and 
Health Administration.205 
 The logic prong has also been a lightening rod for criticism. In 
Globe Newspaper, the Court explained that this inquiry asks whether 
a right of access “plays a particularly significant role in the function-
ing of the judicial process and the government as a whole.”206 For 
example, the Court noted, public scrutiny of a trial can enhance the 
quality of the proceedings by serving as a check on the judiciary as 
well as the integrity of the fact-finding process, foster the appearance 
of fairness and increase public respect for the judicial system, and 
encourage public participation in the government.207 In Press-
Enterprise II, decided only two years later, a dissenting Justice Ste-
vens noted that the logic prong “proves too much” because it is hard 
to imagine any proceeding in which there would be no value in public 
openness.208 Most proceedings, he explained, are arguably an “im-
portant step” in the judicial process in which public monitoring could 
                                                                                                               
203 See 448 U.S. at 565. Some commentators have noted how incongruous it is to 
rely on history when the framers’ only well-documented focus when drafting the First 
Amendment was prohibiting prior restraints. See Kitrosser, supra note 2, at 113–14 (citing 
commentators). 
204 Olson, supra note 153, at 485 (citing cases). 
205 See id. at 485–87. 
206 See 457 U.S. at 606. 
207 See id. 
208 See 478 U.S. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
72 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 25:35 
 
be valuable, and closure of any judicial proceedings would arguably 
deny an outlet for “community rage.”209 Similarly, some commenta-
tors have argued that the logic prong gives “little principled guidance” 
to courts attempting to resolve access claims.210 
 Although the Third Circuit’s general approach to the history prong 
of the Richmond Newspapers test was not significantly different from 
that of the Sixth Circuit, its application of the logic prong was novel. 
Rather than consider the value of public access to removal hearings in 
general, the court considered the value of public access to the particu-
lar subset of “special interest” removal hearings. This approach was 
plainly inconsistent with Globe Newspaper, in which the Supreme 
Court made clear that the proper inquiry is whether there is a right of 
access to criminal trials generally rather than rape trials specifi-
cally.211 The Sixth Circuit’s misapplication of the logic prong of the 
right of access threatens to undermine the right entirely. Weighing the 
“public interest” in national security in the logic prong significantly low-
ers the standard the government must meet to obtain closure. The 
Third Circuit itself recognized the “force of [the plaintiffs’] contention” 
that the government’s showing would not satisfy strict scrutiny if the 
court had concluded that the presumptive right of access attached.212 
 The D.C. Circuit’s decision similarly brought to the forefront the 
limitations that have plagued FOIA since its inception. As discussed 
earlier, the courts persist in deferring to the Executive’s claims regard-
ing the continued non-disclosure of classified information pursuant to 
FOIA’s Exemption 1, despite Congress’s efforts to compel more 
searching judicial review.213 In Center for National Security Studies, 
the court took this deference one step farther, finding that it is appro-
priate to defer to the Executive’s assessment that releasing informa-
tion would harm national security, even when the information at issue 
is not classified.214 In so doing, the D.C. Circuit has essentially cre-
ated a broad “national security” exception to FOIA. 
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B. Failure to Recognize the Value of the Public’s Right to Know 
 Even more disturbing in the recent access cases was the judici-
ary’s view that the right of access lacks significant value. Both the 
D.C. and Third Circuits failed to recognize the importance of an open 
government for the democratic process. 
 When determining whether the public’s interest in openness 
proceedings outweighed the government’s interest in national secu-
rity, the Third Circuit gave virtually no weight to the democratic im-
portance of openness and the checking function that informed public 
debate can have on government actors.215 Instead, the court dis-
paraged the value of openness as merely providing a “community 
benefit of emotional catharsis.” With this limited view of the value of 
the right of access, the court not surprisingly concluded that it was 
“impossible” to weigh this interest “against the security risk of dis-
closing the United States’ methods of investigation and the extent of 
its knowledge.”216 Indeed, the Third Circuit went so far as to state 
that “the reality” was that “the persons most directly affected by the 
Creppy Directive are the media.”217 Both the Third and D.C. Circuits 
accepted the government’s assurances that it had respected the civil 
liberties of the detainees by protecting their due process rights and 
providing them access to counsel. The D.C. Circuit explained that 
press access was unnecessary because the detainees “had access 
to counsel, access to the courts, and freedom to contact the press or 
the public at large.”218 
 As has now been well-documented, the Justice Department nei-
ther respected the civil liberties of the detainees nor afforded them a 
timely or adequate means of communicating with their families or 
counsel, much less the press. Shortly before the D.C. Circuit’s opinion 
was issued, the Department of Justice’s own Inspector General re-
leased a report revealing myriad problems with the government’s han-
dling of detainees.219 For example, the detainees waited an average 
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of fifteen days to receive notice of the charges against them.220 
Some were held in unduly harsh conditions and subjected to abuse 
and mistreatment.221 The Bureau of Prisons imposed a “communica-
tions blackout” that lasted several weeks, during which the detainees 
were not permitted to receive or make telephone calls, have visitors, 
or send mail.222 Even after this time, prison officials continued to 
withhold the detainees’ location from attorneys and family mem-
bers.223 The detainees had great difficulty obtaining legal representa-
tion because they were permitted only one weekly phone call, and the 
lists of attorneys the government provided were outdated and con-
tained incorrect phone numbers.224 Contrary to the D.C. Circuit’s 
conclusion that “many of the detainees have links to terrorism,”225 
most of them did not. According to the Inspector General’s report, 
many detainees were targeted on vague and inconclusive evidence, 
such as “a landlord reporting suspicious activity by an Arab tenant,” or 
someone complaining that a retail store had “too many” Middle East-
ern employees.226 As Professor David Cole has said, the Inspector 
General’s report revealed that “Ashcroft was shooting in the dark and 
virtually every one of his shots missed.”227 Of the estimated 5,000 
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alien detainees, only three have been charged with crimes relating to 
terrorism, and none to the September 11 attacks.228 
 In any event, the courts’ focus on the underlying rights of the 
detainees ignores the broader purposes of the right of access. It is 
not simply the media that benefits from openness, but the public that 
they serve. It is through the press—and increasingly watchdog 
groups—that the public learn about the government’s processes and 
see for themselves whether those processes are fair. It is not merely 
about the “emotional catharsis” value of openness, but the democ-
ratic values this openness serves. If the government released infor-
mation about the detainees and it turned out that the detainees were 
treated properly, this fact would increase the public’s confidence in 
the government. Instead, by concealing detainee information, the 
government only gives credence to the suspicion that the govern-
ment has something to hide. 
 The Sixth Circuit had no trouble identifying the public’s interest in 
presumptively open removal proceedings, particularly in a time of cri-
sis.229 It closed its opinion by noting that the open proceedings best 
served the public’s interest, particularly after September 11, in order to 
“ensur[e] that our government is held accountable to the people and 
that First Amendment rights are not impermissibly compromised.”230 
Noting that “[d]emocracies die behind closed doors,” the court said 
that: 
[i]t would be ironic, indeed, to allow the Government’s as-
sertion of plenary power to transform the First Amendment 
from the great instrument of open democracy to a safe har-
bor from public scrutiny. . . . Even though the political 
branches may have unfettered discretion to deport and ex-
clude certain people, requiring the Government to account 
for their choices assures an informed public—a founda-
tional principle of democracy.231  
It is difficult to comprehend how public pressure can begin to be ef-
fective if the public does not even have sufficient information by 
which to judge its government. 
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C. Public Pressure is Unreliable and Insufficient 
 In rejecting the right of access to deportation proceedings for 
immigrants rounded up after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the 
Third Circuit also suggested that the right of access was unimportant 
because there was, “as always, the powerful check of political ac-
countability on Executive discretion.”232 This statement reflects the 
court’s profound misconception of the role of judicial review and the 
important role of the courts in checking the other two branches of 
government. The Third Circuit abdicated its role and left it to the po-
litical process to check the government’s failure to disclose informa-
tion. 
 This approach is not a novel one, and indeed was the majority 
view of the Court prior to the Richmond Newspapers decision in 
1980. Justice Stewart famously declared in a law review article he 
authored: 
There is no constitutional right to have access to particular 
government information, or to require openness from the bu-
reaucracy. . . . The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of 
Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act. . . . [W]e must 
rely, as so often in our system we must, on the tug and pull of 
the political forces in American society.233 
Chief Justice Burger argued in the plurality opinion in Houchins (prior 
to Richmond Newspapers) that recognizing the right of access would 
“invite[] the Court to involve itself in what is clearly a legislative task 
which the Constitution has left to the political processes” and that 
instead, “we must rely, as so often in our system we must, on the tug 
and pull of the political forces in American society.”234 
 But as scholars have argued for decades, abandoning the right of 
access to the whims of the political process is problematic. The gov-
ernment’s tendency to suppress damaging news and to highlight fa-
vorable news is often a deliberate effort to skew public debate and the 
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public’s perception of the government’s performance and foreign af-
fairs.235 Former executive branch officials have admitted that they 
selectively released sensitive information in a conscious effort to gen-
erate public support for its policies or serve some other bureaucratic or 
personal agenda.236 For example, former national security advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski admitted that he released otherwise sensitive in-
formation for “explicit administration purposes,” the former Assistant 
Secretary of Defense under President Carter conceded that “he ‘had 
the authority to declassify particular pieces of information when that 
seemed necessary,’” and a White House official under President Ken-
nedy agreed that high-ranking administration officials “knowingly and 
deliberately disseminated [classified] information from time to time in 
order to advance the interests of a particular person, [or] policy.”237 As 
one commentator noted, “the executive’s power to classify and de-
classify information raises the specter of government misinformation, 
or its weaker and less noxious relative, ‘spin control.’”238 The result is a 
distortion of the public debate on fundamental public issues. 
 Although the Executive has not hesitated to release details con-
cerning the arrest and prosecution of individuals believed to have a 
connection to terrorism—such as Hamdi, Padilla, and Moussaoui— 
the Executive has continued to resist information requests regarding 
the other individuals investigated after September 11 who have been 
found to have no connection to terrorism. This sort of selective dis-
closure of information raises the concern that the government is 
abusing the “national security” umbrella to conceal its counterterror-
ism efforts that have been less than successful and in turn to “spin” 
public debate on the government’s performance. 
 The political process notoriously has failed to force the disclo-
sure of information, particularly in times of crisis. A particularly in-
structive example of this failure is the “trial” of eight Nazi saboteurs 
during World War II.239 
 In 1942, eight Nazis landed on the shores of the United States in 
a bungled attempt to sabotage the nation’s industrial complexes.240 
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Their plans were never set in motion, and their brief visit to the United 
States was cut short after one member of the conspiracy turned eve-
ryone in to the FBI.241 Although the government announced that the 
FBI had foiled a Nazi plot and released some information about the 
plot itself and the identities of the captured, it purposely failed to dis-
seminate any information about the conditions of the arrests in order 
to obtain the greatest political benefit possible.242 The government 
implied that other sabotage attempts were possible, and that therefore 
releasing information about how these eight men were captured might 
undermine the government’s efforts.243 As a result, the public cele-
brated the FBI’s “victory” over the Nazis, a bit of good news in an oth-
erwise grim period of the war.244 
 The government specifically chose to use a military tribunal to 
try the saboteurs in order to conduct the proceedings in secret.245 
The tribunal announced that this secrecy was essential for national 
security, while in truth, the government merely did not want to reveal 
that one of the saboteurs had surrendered the group.246 The trial 
was held on the fifth floor of the Department of Justice, in a lecture 
room literally shrouded in secrecy, with heavy black curtains draped 
over the windows and the glass doors on each end of the room 
blacked out.247 The press and public were excluded from the pro-
ceedings, except when a small group of reporters was permitted to 
take pictures of the hearing room while proceedings were sus-
pended.248 General McCoy, the president of the commission, issued 
daily communiqués to the press about the trial, but these releases 
typically consisted of little more than the times the hearings com-
menced and concluded.249 
                                                                                                               
241 See id. at 157–59. 
242 See id. at 169–70; see also Lloyd Cutler, What I Saw at a Military Tribunal, Time, 
Nov. 19, 2001, at http://www.time.com (web exclusive) (noting that “Hoover . . . wanted to 
maximize the public relations value of the arrests”). The government released only “the 
names, photographs and brief biographies of the eight men, a description of their weap-
ons, a list of their objectives, where and how they landed, and very little else.” Rachlis, 
supra note 239, at 169. 
243 See Rachlis, supra note 239, at 170. 
244 See id. 
245 See id. at 174. 
246 Louis Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs on Trial 54 (2003). 
247 See Fisher, supra note 246, at 53; Rachlis, supra note 239, at 182–83. 
248 See Fisher, supra note 246, at 53, 55; Rachlis, supra note 239, at 177–78. 
249 Rachlis, supra note 239, at 177–78. 
2005] The Public's Right to Know and the War on Terror 79 
 
 Although the press was frustrated with its limited access to the 
proceedings, the secrecy did not bother the public much at all.250 In-
stead, the public’s debate focused on why the government was taking 
so long to execute these men and whether death by hanging or firing 
squad was more appropriate.251 When the Supreme Court an-
nounced it would hold a special session to consider the defendants’ 
habeas corpus claim of entitlement to trial before a civil court, the pub-
lic and most of the press expressed outrage that such a “spectacle” 
would be held for “a group that came among us to blast, burn and 
kill.”252 There was no public pressure to hold the military trial pro-
ceedings in the open; if anything, the public was pressuring the gov-
ernment not to hold any trial at all. 
 The treatment of the Nazi saboteurs is of course just one exam-
ple of a time during the history of the United States when the majority 
has willingly jettisoned the civil liberties of minority groups. During 
the Palmer Raids in the 1920s, the public did not complain when 
immigrants were rounded up as suspects in the bombing of Attorney 
General Palmer’s home. During World War II, the public did not ob-
ject to the internment of citizens and noncitizens of Japanese, Italian, 
or German origin. Undoubtedly such apathy is due at least in part to 
the majority’s readiness to regard foreigners as inherently suspect. 
 This is not to deny that public pressure has at times been an 
effective mechanism for forcing greater government transparency. 
But during the so-called “War on Terror,” the political process has led 
to the arbitrary and calculated declassification and release of infor-
mation. The arbitrariness of the classification system as well as the 
Executive’s prerogative to override the classification system has be-
come clear as the executive branch has selectively agreed to de-
classify documents in response to pressure from the September 11 
Commission. With the September 11 Commission’s investigation of 
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the failure to prevent the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, 
the executive branch finds itself declassifying information in re-
sponse to political pressure. But three years have passed since Sep-
tember 11. Access to three-year-old government information, al-
though still valuable, is no substitute for the timely receipt of 
information. 
 Political pressure has been notably ineffective or virtually nonexis-
tent when noncitizens are involved. Most obviously, noncitizens can-
not vote, and as a result they wield little political might. Instead, they 
must rely on voting citizens to be sufficiently concerned with the con-
duct of elected officials to exercise political muscle for those who are 
disenfranchised.253 This remote possibility becomes even less likely 
when the government conceals or distorts information about its treat-
ment of noncitizens. Certainly with respect to the post-9/11 detainees, 
some watchdog groups suspected that, based on the limited informa-
tion they managed to amass, the detainees were mistreated. In the 
face of the government’s continued denials of maltreatment, however, 
their concerns were easily dismissed as hysterical. 
Conclusion 
 The Freedom of Information Act and the First Amendment right 
of access have served as poor tools for ensuring the public’s ability 
to obtain information about the government’s detention of individuals 
as part of its counterterrorism efforts. As demonstrated above, a va-
riety of factors contribute to this problem. FOIA is riddled with large, 
undefined exceptions. When information arguably involves national 
security, courts are too timid to force the executive branch to provide 
a thorough explanation for continued secrecy. The First Amendment 
right of access likewise has significant limitations. Although the 
scope of the right has expanded significantly since the Supreme 
Court first recognized it in the Richmond Newspapers decision, its 
scope remains severely limited. Courts have been willing to extend 
the right beyond criminal trials to include some criminal and civil pre-
trial proceedings and records, but they have hesitated to recognize 
the right outside of the judicial context. Even when they have willingly 
recognized the extension of the right into administrative proceedings, 
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courts have twisted the Richmond Newspapers test so as to favor 
the continued concealment of any information allegedly pertaining to 
national security. 
 The “right to know” has encountered additional and more disturb-
ing problems since the terrorist attacks of September 11. Not only has 
the courts’ tendency to defer to the Executive’s national security risk 
assessment become exaggerated, but courts now appear overtly hos-
tile to the very existence of a right of access during a time of crisis. In-
stead, they suggest that an enforceable right to know is unnecessary 
because the political process is adequate to force government disclo-
sure. History demonstrates, however, that the political process is woe-
fully inadequate to realize this purpose. Although the government has 
been somewhat more forthcoming with information about detained citi-
zens, its voluntary disclosure in reality is little more than a smoke-
screen. In the end, the public has been receiving insufficient informa-
tion about the government’s counterterrorism efforts with respect to 
citizens and noncitizens alike to make an informed judgment about its 
performance. 
